The relationship between financial performance and SRI strategies on mutual funds - Evidence from Europe by Sippola, Pirkka
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between financial performance and SRI 
strategies on mutual funds - Evidence from Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s Thesis 
Pirkka Sippola 
Aalto University School of Business 
Department of Finance 
Fall 2019 
1 
 
 
Author  Pirkka Sippola 
Title of thesis  The relationship between financial performance and SRI strategies on mutual funds - 
Evidence from Europe 
Degree  Bachelor’s degree 
Degree programme  Finance 
Thesis advisor(s)  Joni Kokkonen 
Year of approval  2019 Number of pages  22 Language  English 
Abstract 
 
Social responsibility has become a hot topic during the past few years, and one aspect of it is the benefits 
and costs it brings to a socially responsible investor. The purpose of this study is to examine whether 
different SRI strategies used by equity mutual funds are related to their financial performance. By using 
multiple regression analysis and a sample of 127 European SRI mutual funds over the period from 2007 to 
2019, I do not find a significant relationship between screening intensity and financial performance for SRI 
funds, neither a significant curvilinear relationship. Furthermore, there is no evidence that shareholder 
activism in ESG matters would positively relate to financial performance. However, I find evidence that 
funds with below-average or low ESG ratings outperform funds with above-average or high ESG ratings. 
This result suggests that, on average, investors pursuing to invest in highly rated ESG funds pay a premium 
on their investment strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) has recently gained popularity as an investment strategy. Over the last 
decades, there has been growing demand from conscious private and institutional investors towards 
environmental sustainability and social awareness. As environmental and social issues have played a 
significant role in many investors’ choices, SRI has been designed to meet such needs. As a result, many 
mutual funds have incorporated SRI into their investment strategies aiming for both financial and 
environmental/social return instead of financial only.  
According to the European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif), SRI is an investment strategy that 
implements Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria in investment decisions (Eurosif, 2018). 
This definition in mind, the performance of SRI funds have been put into the spotlight by a growing number 
of researchers that have studied the relationship between SRI investing and financial profits. Most of the 
current research seems to ﬁnd a nonnegative relationship between these two (Friede et al., 2015). More 
importantly, many studies seem to report positive ﬁndings highlighting that the positive ESG impact on 
corporate financial performance appears stable over time. However, it is good to notice the heterogeneity 
of SRI funds as well as the differences in SRI strategies and the intensity of screening, affecting the quality 
of the research. 
In this paper, I study the relationship between different SRI strategies of European equity mutual funds and 
their financial performance. I will investigate the effect of different identified elements of SRI that are, in 
my case, the number of screens, ESG rating, and shareholder activism (Eurosif, 2018). I will focus on pan-
European mutual funds as Europe has a long history in SRI investing, and there is enough fund-level data 
available. My findings contribute to existing research by analysing the effects of the specific SRI strategies in 
127 European SRI mutual funds between 2007 and 2019.  
There are several valid reasons to re-examine some of the earlier research in this paper. First, few studies 
examine SRI performance over the past years. Second, there are fewer studies that concentrate on the pan-
European level, and the findings for those are not fully consistent (Friede et al., 2015). Third, it is obvious 
that during the past few years there has been a vastly increased interest in sustainability and ESG issues, 
meaning that some fundaments of SRI investing might have changed. Last, by dividing the sample period 
into two, I’m able to investigate SRI fund performances between the financial crisis and the current SRI 
boom, as well as compare my findings against earlier similar research (e.g. Nofsinger et al., 2014.) 
As the main results, I do not find a significant relation between screening intensity and financial 
performance for SRI funds, neither a curvilinear relationship. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
shareholder activism in ESG matters would positively relate to financial performance. However, I find 
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evidence that funds with below-average or low ESG ratings outperform funds with above-average or high 
ESG ratings. 
 
1.1. Literature review and theoretical motivations 
 
First, this literature review describes the different SRI strategies applied by mutual funds in the European 
market. Second, I will explain and discuss the two main theories — the modern portfolio theory and the 
stakeholder theory, that mostly link to SRI mutual funds’ performance related to the financial markets. Last, 
I will review and discuss the previous literature examining the impact of SRI strategies on mutual funds’ 
financial performance. 
 
SRI strategies 
Eurosif (2018) has classified SRI strategies into seven different categories. In this paper, I will concentrate 
on the three first ones. The seven strategies are explained as follows:  
1. Exclusion of holdings from the investment universe  
2. Engagement and voting on sustainability matters  
3. Best-in-Class investment selection 
4. ESG integration  
5. Norms-based screening  
6. Sustainability themed investment  
7. Impact investing 
 
According to Eurosif (2018), increasing amounts of investment corroborate positive trends across the SRI 
investment industry, with growth remaining consistent across all strategies at the European level except for 
norms-based screening and exclusions. In general, exclusion is still the most prominent strategy in terms of 
assets with tobacco as the most popular exclusion criteria. However, there is a clear indication of investors’ 
trending willingness to engage with companies they invest in and positively contribute to the sustainability 
of the business model. Besides, best-in-class funds and impact investing registered positive uptakes, while 
norms-based screening, including international initiatives and guidelines such as UN Global Compact, OECD 
Guidelines for MNCs and ILO Convention lost traction as investors appear to be looking elsewhere for 
exclusion-related strategies. 
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As, for example, best-in-class and active engagement strategies have gained traction during the recent 
years in Europe, it is also interesting to provide such research angles regarding the trending SRI strategies.  
 
Modern portfolio theory 
The modern portfolio theory, which was developed by Markowitz (1952), formalises diversification in 
investing mathematically. The idea is that the portfolio’s risk and return should be considered rather than 
an individual asset’s risk and return, suggesting that the investors should choose diversified investment in 
their portfolio by picking assets that correlate with each other as little as possible. Essentially, investors can 
reduce risk through diversification using a quantitative method. Also, Markowitz concludes that unless 
there is a perfect positive correlation between the returns of the risky assets, the risk reduces by 
diversifying across assets. 
The total risk of the portfolio can be divided into two types: systematic risk and unsystematic risk. 
Systematic or market risk is the volatility risk of the whole capital market, while unsystematic or 
idiosyncratic risk affects specific security or industry (Bodie et al., 2014). However, Markowitz shows that by 
holding different stocks, the unsystematic risk carried by the different stocks or assets can offset each 
other, leading into diversification benefits (Markowitz, 1952). In general, the modern portfolio theory 
suggests that investors can and should maximise the expected return of their portfolio for a given level of 
market risk. In addition, the theory assumes that all investors are rational and risk-averse, suggesting that 
they only accept a higher risk if their expected return is higher. 
Connecting the modern portfolio theory into SRI investing, one can argue that when a fund excludes certain 
types of stocks of even industries from its investment universe, the remaining companies have more 
correlation with each other. Therefore, the funds are prone to higher idiosyncratic risk since they are not 
able to build the same effective frontier and optimal portfolio (Kurtz and DiBartolomeo, 1999). 
Furthermore, Walley and Whitehead (1994) argue that the costs related to sustainable investing are not 
offset by the potential financial gains of the investing strategy, leading to a reduced financial performance 
of such funds. 
 
Stakeholder theory 
In contrast to the supporters of the modern portfolio theory, several scholars argue SRI to create novel 
investment opportunities and improve financial performance (Freeman, 1984). The theory suggests that 
taking social dimensions and responsibility into account help companies to efficiently manage their 
resources and, therefore, help them to lower the governance costs, improve their financial performance 
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and, even, reduce company-specific risks (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Lee et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
companies with weak shareholder rights tend to exhibit significant stock market underperformance (Core 
et al., 2016). Highlighting the long-term benefits of corporate social responsibility, Barnett and Salomon 
(2006) argue that corporates managing their stakeholder relationships well over time usually achieve better 
long-term risk-adjusted financial performance.  
 
Previous studies on SRI mutual funds 
As there is a theoretic background supporting investing in socially responsible companies, such an investing 
strategy can be argued to offer better financial performance compared to traditional investing. Thus, the 
costs related to screening in SRI investing could be offset by the positive effects proposed by the 
stakeholder theory. For example, Barnett and Salomon (2006) contribute to this claim showing the 
advantages of social screenings in SRI strategies, if implemented sufficiently. Supporting this argument, 
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) suggest that when SRI funds incorporate multiple screenings, they 
become more selective in picking the best-performing companies into their holdings. Furthermore, Lee et 
al. (2010) claim that SRI funds with highly-screened portfolios have lower total risk as the fund managers 
deliberately choose stocks with lower beta as an attempt to decrease their overall risk. 
Renneboog et al. (2008) hypothesise that the superior performance of SRI funds compared to conventional 
funds can be attributed to the fund-portfolio composition. An explanation could be that the SRI funds 
invest in companies that demonstrate corporate social responsibility and transparency of their operations. 
One can expect that these companies are likely to be better managed and hence, generate better risk-
adjusted-performance. While this conjecture has produced some mixed findings, Friede et al. (2015) show 
in their meta-analysis of over 2200 individual studies that the business case for ESG investing is empirically 
very well-founded. Roughly 90 % of studies ﬁnd a nonnegative relationship between ESG and corporate 
financial performance (CFP). More importantly, most studies seem to report positive ﬁndings highlighting 
that the positive ESG impact on CFP appears stable over time.  
Perhaps the most common criticism of socially responsible investment funds is that imposing non-ﬁnancial 
screens restrict investment opportunities, reduces diversiﬁcation eﬃciencies and thereby adversely 
impacts performance (Lee et al., 2010). As an example, a few studies ﬁnd a curvilinear relation between 
screening intensity and systematic risk, meaning that screening first reduces financial performance, but the 
relationship bounces back when screening intensity becomes high (Lee et al., 2010; Capelle-Blancard et al. 
2014). So-called “sin stocks” also seem to have higher expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks, 
consistent with them being neglected by norm-constrained investors facing greater litigation risk 
heightened by social norms (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). 
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Regarding research regarding SRI performance during different market cycles, Nofsinger et al. (2014) 
suggest that SRI funds perform better than conventional funds in market crisis periods but underperform in 
non-crisis periods. They find that investors seeking downside protection could value this pattern. 
 
1.2. Hypothesis 
 
Based on the previous studies on the financial performance of SRI mutual funds (e.g. Barnett and Salomon, 
2006; Lee et al. 2010; Renneboog et al. 2008; Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2014), I formulate three (3) 
main hypotheses. 
First, I hypothesise that higher screening intensity leads to reduced financial performance. However, as the 
screening intensity reaches a high level, the financial performance increases again. I base the assumption of 
a curvilinear financial performance on the modern portfolio theory and the stakeholder theory. The reason 
is that when a fund’s investment universe is restricted, it could offset the increased costs by investing in 
well-performing companies with good governance and efficient management. 
H1: The relationship between screening intensity and financial performance of SRI mutual funds is 
negative but curvilinear. 
Second, based on the suggestions from Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) and the stakeholder theory, I 
assume that a higher ESG rating of a fund leads to increased financial performance. I use the Morningstar 
ESG rating to evaluate the quality of the screening process of a fund. A fund’s ESG rating is created by 
aggregating portfolio-level ESG scores related to its peer funds. 
H2: The relationship between the quality of an SRI fund’s screening and its financial performance is 
positive. 
Third, shareholder activism including. e.g. voting and other engagement have become the second most 
popular SRI strategy during the past years. The general idea is that shareholders can influence a 
corporation's behaviour in various ESG related issues by exercising their rights as partial owners, aiming to 
change the target company’s culture and practices from inside. E.g. Renneboog et al. (2008) state that 
shareholder activism can lead to a positive impact in financial returns as it emphasises high managerial 
quality and can reduce costs from potential social or environmental crises. Thus, I formulate the following 
third and last main hypothesis: 
H3: SRI funds that use active ownership through engagement and voting have better financial 
performance than those that do not. 
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2. Data and methodology 
 
In this study, I examine 127 SRI mutual funds on the European market over a 13-year sample period ranging 
from January 2007 to August 2019. The full sample period consists of 152 months. First, a list of all SRI 
equity mutual funds in the world is obtained from Morningstar Direct. This list accounts for ~5000 SRI 
funds, of which I only include equity funds both domiciled in Europe and investing European wide, resulting 
in 709 funds. The objective of the study is to examine the fund managers’ ability to make financially and 
socially profitable choices by incorporating SRI strategies, and therefore I only include funds with at least 
one (1) type of screen. Finally, I only include funds that have inception date latest in 2007, and which 
announce their management fees as well as financial performance constantly from January 2007 onwards. 
This exclusion leaves us with a total sample of 127 SRI mutual funds. I collect data for each fund from 
Morningstar Direct accessed via Aalto University for monthly net returns (after fees), fund SRI strategy, 
fund ESG rating, fund’s inception date, fund size, and total management fees.  
 
Dependent variable 
This study aims to examine the relationship between different SRI strategies and financial performance. 
Thus, my dependent variable is the risk-adjusted performance of a given SRI fund over the whole period, 
calculated by Jensen’s alpha. This decision is in line with earlier research, including Barnett and Salomon 
(2006), Lee et al. (2010), and Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014). Jensen’s alpha is a risk-adjusted 
performance measure that represents the average return on a portfolio or investment, above or below that 
predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Jensen's measure is widely used to determine a 
portfolio manager’s ability to earn an abnormal return for the used level of risk. Based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, we calculate Jensen’s alpha as follows (Jensen, 1967): 
Ri,t – rf,t = αi + βi (Rm,t – rf,t ) + εi,t, 
where Ri,t is the return on portfolio for fund i in month t, rf,t is the risk-free local rate in month t, αi is 
Jensen’s alpha for fund i, βi is the beta of the portfolio with respect to the appropriate market index, Rm,t is 
the return for the appropriate market index in month t, and εi,t denotes the random error term. If the alpha 
is positive and significant, it indicates that the fund outperforms the market and earns more than the 
expected risk-adjusted return. 
For the risk-free rate, I use the 3-month Euribor rate, similarly to Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014). For 
the market index, I use the MSCI Europe Total Return (Net) Index. I find this index being the closest 
approximate of European market returns for the study. E.g. Bauer et al. (2007) suggest that using a regular 
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index for SRI funds better explains their performance. One explanation of this is that using SRI indices as a 
proxy for market returns does not always fully reflect the screening strategies used by different SRI funds as 
there is a lot of heterogeneity in the practices and strategies of such funds. Thus, it is preferred to stick with 
the regular market index in this study. 
 
Independent variables 
I include the following independent variables: screening intensity, the square of screening intensity, 
shareholder activism, high ESG rating, above-average ESG rating, below average ESG rating and low ESG 
rating. I assume these factors to stay unchanged over the sample period of 13 years. I include shareholder 
activism and the different ESG ratings as dummies and screening intensity as a quantitative variable. The 
more screens a fund incorporates in its strategy, the more restricted its investment universe is, highlighting 
the possible lack of diversification for a specific fund.  
For incorporating screening intensity as a variable, I follow the categorisation employed by US SIF, namely 
environment, social, governance, and products (“sin stocks”) related screens. As an addition to the 
categorization, I include the deployment of norm-based screening as a type of screen (e.g. Capelle-Blancard 
and Monjon, 2014). From Morningstar Direct, I’m able to identify 21 matching screens that can be either 
exclusive or positive by nature. I drop out corporate governance-based screens as enough data is not 
available from Morningstar.  
 
Control variables 
Like earlier research, I aim to control for factors that could affect the financial performance of the studied 
funds systematically. I include the following controls to my model: fund size, total management fees of a 
fund, and fund age. For fund size, I calculate the logarithm for the latest data point of a fund’s size in EUR. I 
use Morningstar’s classification for management fees including management, administrative, 12b-1 fees, 
and other costs that are taken out of assets. For fund age, I measure age by the number of years since the 
inception date.   
The factors I include as controls are seen to affect the financial performance of a mutual fund in earlier 
research papers. For example, older funds accumulate collective experience over time that might be 
invaluable when picking new stocks and managing the current portfolio (Argote, 1999). Besides, bigger 
funds could, in theory, outperform smaller funds due to the potential economies of scale. However, there is 
evidence of a slightly negative relationship between fund size and financial performance (Chen et al., 2004). 
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Regarding management fees, I follow the example of Renneboog et al. (2008) and include it as one of the 
three control variables.  
 
Model 
Finally, I arrive in the following empirical model for my study. Multiple regression is used to study the 
relationship between Jensen’s alpha and the variables. Based on the assumptions explained earlier and to 
answer the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, I build the following model to examine the relationship between 
risk-adjusted performance, screening intensity, active ownership, and the quality of an SRI fund’s screening: 
Alphai = α0 + β1 SIi + β2 SI2i + β3 Activismi + β4 ESG highi + β5 ESG above averagei + β6 ESG below averagei + 
β7 ESG lowi + β8 Sizei + β9 MFi + β10 Agei + εi,   
where alpha relates to annual Jensen’s alpha for fund i, SIi represents screening intensity, and SI2i is the 
square of screening intensity, since I aim to investigate a possible curvilinear relationship between 
screening and risk-adjusted-performance. Activismi stands for active shareholder engagement for fund I as 
a dummy. ESG highi, ESG above averagei, ESG below averagei, and ESG lowi as dummy variables stand for 
the quality of the SRI screening process for fund i. Sizei, MFi and Agei, are the control variables to represent 
size as log, management fees, and age in years since inception for fund I. 
 
Ethical considerations and limitations of the empirical study 
The regression data points are acquired directly from Morningstar Direct’s database. However, the data 
points for screening intensity and ESG ratings are only available from 2019, lacking historical data. Thus, I 
must assume that the SRI policies and ESG ratings of the studied funds have stayed the same during the 
whole sample period that, in practice, can affect the reliability of the results. However, the strategic policies 
shouldn’t change too often in such funds. 
Second, I must account for the possible survivorship bias in the sample. However, as I recognise that 
Morningstar Direct is survivorship biased as a database, I’m not aware of studies that would suggest the 
existence of a survivorship bias within the SRI mutual fund universe. Renneboog et al. (2008) note the 
attrition rate of SRI funds is 0.25 per cent for the global funds in their sample. Such a low rate means that 
there should be a very limited chance for funds dropping out from the sample for the period I use. 
At last, since OLS regression assumes that there is no correlation between the errors and that the variance 
of the error term is constant (Barnett and Salomon, 2006), further tests could be performed to control for 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. However, the pairwise correlation between all the variables is 
quite small in my sample except screening intensity and the square of screening intensity. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The full sample contains in total of 8636 monthly returns (127 funds * 68 months) for Jensen’s alpha. Tables 
1 and 2 show some descriptive statistics of the used variables. Table 1 shows the differences in screening 
quality and the level of shareholder activism in the European SRI funds of this sample. The biggest share of 
the SRI funds classifies as average ESG funds (36.2 % or 46 funds). Also, the sample consists of a relatively 
bigger share of high/above-average ESG funds (41.7 % or 53 funds) than below average/low ESG funds 
(22.1 % or 28 funds). This figure shows that most European SRI funds are not just in theory but, in practice, 
quite well-performing by the Morningstar’s ESG standards. Regarding the share of SRI funds with 
shareholder activism strategy, Table 1 shows that around a quarter of the funds (23.6 % or 30 funds) have 
incorporated such strategy.  
Table 1 
Screening quality and shareholder activism of the European SRI fund sample 
Panel A concerns the ESG rating in different levels, and Panel B suggests the percentage of funds with 
shareholder activism strategy.  
Panel A: ESG Rating     Percentage of funds   Number of funds   
High    17.3 %   22   
Above average    24.4 %   31   
Average    36.2 %   46   
Below average    19.7 %   25   
Low    2.4 %   3   
Panel B: Shareholder Activism               
Yes    23.6 %   30   
No    76.4 %   97   
 
As reported in Table 2, the fund ages range from 13 years since inception to 40 years. The average age of 
the funds is almost 18 years. Management fees range from 0 % to nearly 3 %, and the average management 
fee is 1.14 %. Besides, the average number of screens for the SRI funds is 3.9, ranging from 1 to 16. This 
figure means that no fund in the sample have incorporated all the different identified screens, the 
maximum being 21 different types of screens.  
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. It shows that only the screening intensity and the 
square of the screening intensity are highly correlated. However, this is naturally driven by the 
mathematical calculation. 
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Table 2   
Characteristics of the SRI fund sample   
This table reports some descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum) concerning 
the number of screens (SI), active ownership (activism), different ESG ratings (excl. average rating), size 
(log), age (in years since inception), and management fees (MF).  
Independent variables Mean   Std. Dev   Min    Max 
SI   3.906  3.223  1  16 
Activism   0.236  0.426  0  1 
ESG Rating High  0.173  0.380  0  1 
ESG Rating Above av  0.244  0.431  0  1 
ESG Rating Below av  0.197  0.399  0  1 
ESG Rating Low  0.024  0.152  0  1 
Control variables                 
Size (log)   8.313  0.754  4.127  9.975 
Management Fee  1.144  0.567  0.000  2.990 
Age     17.630   4.729   13.000   40.000 
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix for the variables.  
The table excludes ESG above-average and ESG below-average ratings due to the limited space.  
  Alpha SI SI^2 Activism 
ESG 
High 
ESG 
Low 
Size 
(log) MF Age 
Alpha 1         
SI 
   -
0.029 1        
SI^2 -0.010 0.962 1       
Activism -0.100 0.097 0.104 1      
ESG high -0.217 0.124 0.034 -0.206 1     
ESG low 0.238 -0.125 -0.075 -0.087 -0.071 1    
Size (log) 0.241 -0.174 -0.112 0.040 -0.063 0.073 1   
MF 0.171 0.103 0.074 -0.031 0.063 -0.087 -0.138 1  
Age 0.134 -0.074 -0.093 0.036 -0.004 -0.032 0.184 -0.077 1 
 
Table 4 shows the performance differences regarding net returns, alpha, and Sharpe for the different fund 
categories. The alphas for the whole sample range from -0.702 to 0.535 and the average alpha is 0.046. 
Funds with average ESG scores and small-sized funds have the highest standard deviations for both alpha 
and Sharpe of the different categories. In contrast, funds with active ownership have the lowest standard 
deviation for alpha and Sharpe, followed by high/above-average ESG funds.  
In addition, funds with below-average / low ESG ratings have, on average, the highest return, alpha, and 
Sharpe of all the different categories. They outperform high/above-average ESG funds with 130 % better 
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return, 170% alpha and 40% Sharpe. Also, the performance difference between below average/low ESG 
funds and average ESG funds is noteworthy, although much smaller. This implies that funds with lower ESG 
ratings have better financial performance. On the other hand, funds in big size outperform smaller funds on 
average, and funds without active ownership outperform funds with active ownership strategy. 
Skewness is positive for the alphas in most categories, except average ESG funds and below-average/low 
ESG funds, indicating that the values concentrate mainly to the left side of the mean values in the different 
categories, and the extreme values are on the right. Regarding Kurtosis, the number is less than three (3) 
for all the categories, meaning that the distribution is shorter, and tails are thinner than the normal 
distribution. 
Table 4 
Performance between different categories 
The table shows the minimum, maximum and mean values for portfolio net return (after fees), Jensen’s 
alpha and Sharpe ratio. Besides, it shows the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for these different 
fund categories. I also regard top 40 % in size as big funds and lowest 40 % in size as small funds. 
Category     Variable Min Mean Max Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Whole sample  Return -0.488 0.318 0.790 0.193 -0.297 2.415 
n= 127   Alpha -0.702 0.046 0.535 0.196 0.233 1.275 
      Sharpe -0.252 -0.123 -0.028 0.037 0.243 0.791 
Funds with high/ 
above-average ESG  Return -0.238 0.222 0.479 0.128 -1.426 5.027 
n= 53   Alpha -0.273 -0.037 0.314 0.132 0.163 -0.134 
      Sharpe -0.192 -0.141 -0.082 0.024 -0.464 -0.101 
Funds with average ESG Return -0.488 0.426 0.790 0.042 -1.283 4.091 
n= 52   Alpha -0.702 0.142 0.535 0.234 -0.605 1.784 
      Sharpe -0.252 -0.103 -0.028 0.042 -0.603 1.478 
Funds with below-
average/low ESG  Return 0.088 0.511 0.790 0.181 -0.815 -0.045 
n= 28   Alpha -0.135 0.232 0.535 0.192 -0.523 -0.642 
      Sharpe -0.159 -0.085 -0.028 0.037 -0.744 -0.383 
Funds in big size  Return 0.143 0.359 0.790 0.157 1.058 0.625 
n= 51   Alpha -0.158 0.073 0.535 0.147 1.302 1.877 
      Sharpe -0.167 -0.118 -0.028 0.030 1.291 1.556 
Funds in small size  Return -0.488 0.269 0.696 0.228 -0.569 2.009 
n= 51   Alpha -0.702 0.003 0.506 0.233 0.179 1.024 
      Sharpe -0.252 -0.133 -0.045 0.043 0.148 0.345 
Funds with active ownership Return 0.143 0.283 0.477 0.093 0.576 -0.654 
n= 30   Alpha -0.158 0.011 0.248 0.117 0.670 -0.213 
      Sharpe -0.167 -0.132 -0.082 0.022 0.600 0.105 
Funds without active         
ownership  Return -0.488 0.329 0.790 0.214 -0.427 1.798 
n= 97   Alpha -0.702 0.057 0.535 0.214 0.095 0.878 
      Sharpe -0.252 -0.121 -0.028 0.040 0.077 0.467 
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3.2. Regression results and analysis 
 
I run the main tests by regressing Jensen’s alpha over screening intensity, the square of screening intensity, 
shareholder activism, ESG high, ESG above average, ESG below average, ESG low, and the control variables. 
The results are shown in Table 5 below. Module (1) includes only the independent variables. Modules (2) 
and (3) add one control variable at a time, and module (4) includes all the considered controls in addition to 
the independent variables. I include the whole sample period from 2007 to 2019 into my main tests. 
The regression results show that I can’t find a significant relationship between screening intensity and 
financial performance for the funds. The relationship is slightly negative (-0.013 % monthly), but the results 
are insignificant in all modules. The square of screening intensity is slightly positive, implying for a 
curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship between screening intensity and financial performance. However, the 
results are not significant either for any of the different modules. Thus, I don’t find enough statistical 
support for hypothesis 1.  
My regression results show that fund specific ESG ratings correlate with financial performance in all the 
different rating levels. Interestingly, the results show the opposite effect compared to my original 
hypothesis 2. High ESG funds lost a monthly return of -0.097 %, and above-average ESG funds lost slightly 
less return of -0.087 %, both results being robust at a 5 % significance level. On the contrary, below average 
ESG funds earned 0.152 % positive monthly return, and the small portion of low ESG funds even 0.291 % 
positive return, both results being significant at the 1 % level. The results imply that lower ESG rated mutual 
funds attract better financial returns than higher ESG rated funds. Thus, I can’t accept hypothesis 2.  
For my last hypothesis (H3), I can’t find a significant relationship between shareholder activism and fund 
financial performance. Thus, I must reject the hypothesis. The relationship seems to be slightly negative, 
but the results are not robust in any of the different modules. 
For the different control variables, I find evidence at a 5 % significance level that fund size correlates 
positively with financial returns, in contrast to Chen et al. (2004). Furthermore, management fees have a 
positive impact on the financial performance of 0.074 % monthly at a 1 % robustness level.  
In general, the SRI funds in my sample have underperformed the European market index during 2007 and 
2019. This is an interesting finding compared to most of the earlier research that ﬁnd a nonnegative 
relationship between SRI strategies and financial returns (Friede et al., 2015).  
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Table 5 
The impact of the SRI strategies on financial performance 
This table presents results from OLS regression of risk-adjusted performance on the characteristics of SRI 
strategies. The dependent variable is Jensen’s alpha. The independent variables are screening intensity (SI), 
the square of screening intensity (SI^2), active ownership (activism), and different ESG ratings (excluding 
average ESG rating). The sample includes 127 SRI mutual funds. (D) indicates a dummy variable. Standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Module (1) includes independent 
variables. Module (2) adds size as a control variable. Module (3) adds size and management fee as control 
variables. Module (4) adds size, management fee & age as control variables. 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
          
SI  -0.019  -0.007  -0.012  -0.013  
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
SI^2  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Activism (D)  -0.042  -0.047  -0.047  -0.049  
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036)  
ESG High (D)  -0.081*  -0.085*  -0.095**  -0.097**  
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.045)  
ESG Above av. (D) -0.083*  -0.070*  -0.084**  -0.087**  
  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.041)  
ESG Belov av. (D) 0.185***  0.175***  0.159***  0.152***  
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.043)  
ESG low (D)  0.285***  0.2884*** 0.291***  0.291***  
  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.100)  
Size    0.040*  0.045**  0.043**  
    (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
MF      0.072***  0.074***  
      (0.026)  (0.026)  
Age        0.002  
        (0.003)  
Constant  0.083  -0.274  -0.386*  -0.402**  
  (0.055)  (0.198)  (0.197)  (0.199)  
R^2  0.307  0.328  0.369  0.371  
 
 
I also run the regression model for Jensen’s alpha for two different time periods, 2007-2013 and 2014-
2019, looking for potential performance differences in the different economic cycles. The first sub-period 
(2007-2013) is designed to examine fund performances during the economic recession, whereas the latter 
period (2014-2019) stands for the recent economic upturn in Europe. It is also interesting to investigate 
whether the recently raised awareness towards social and environmental issues in Europe as well as the 
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increased investment activity of SRI mutual funds have resulted in a higher financial performance of such 
funds. 
Table 6 shows differences in the variables and overall performance between the two time periods. The 
main differences are that funds with below-average and low ESG ratings lose their statistical significance for 
outperformance during the latter period. Another noteworthy result is the highlighted difference in alphas 
when cutting the period into two. During the economic downturn, alpha is nearly 1 per cent negative           
(-0.944 %) at a 5 % significance level, compared to the positive monthly return of 0.189 % during 2014-
2019. However, Jensen’s alpha loses its significance during 2014-2019. 
 
Table 6 
The impact of different time periods on financial performance 
This table presents results from OLS regression of financial performance on different time periods. The 
dependent variable is the risk-adjusted performance, measured by Jensen’s alpha. The independent 
variables are screening intensity (SI), the square of screening intensity (SI^2), active ownership (activism), 
and different ESG ratings (excluding average ESG rating). The sample includes 127 SRI equity funds. (D) 
indicates a dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
        2007-2019 2007-2013 2014-2019 
          
SI    -0.013  -0.021  -0.013  
    (0.020)  (0.037)  (0.020)  
SI^2    0.001  0.002  0.001  
    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
Activism (D)   -0.049  -0.051  -0.052  
    (0.036)  (0.065)  (0.035)  
ESG High (D)   -0.097**  -0.118  -0.049  
    (0.045)  (0.083)  (0.045)  
ESG Above average (D)  -0.087**  -0.049  -0.126***  
    (0.041)  (0.075)  (0.041)  
ESG Belov average (D)  0.152***  0.287***  0.024  
    (0.043)  (0.079)  (0.043)  
ESG Low (D)   0.291***  0.402**  0.166*  
    (0.100)  (0.182)  (0.098)  
Size    0.043**  0.033  0.056***  
    (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.021)  
MF    0.074***  0.141***  0.011  
    (0.026)  (0.048)  (0.026)  
Age    0.002  0.005  0.001  
    (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Constant    -0.402**  -0.944**  0.189  
    (0.199)  (0.361)  (0.195)  
R^2    0.371  0.289  0.232  
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Finally, I compile my three main hypotheses into Table 7 to compare the obtained results with earlier 
similar studies. In general, my results are mostly in line with similar research. Regarding ESG ratings and 
shareholder activism, neither Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) nor Renneboog et al. (2008) have found 
statistical significance results that those strategies would correlate with a positive financial performance of 
SRI funds. 
Regarding the relationship between screening intensity and financial performance, the previous research 
results are more divided. Barnett and Salomon (2006), as well as Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014), 
suggest a curvilinear relationship. In other words, they find evidence for a negative relationship between 
the number of screens and mutual fund financial performance but a rebound of risk-adjusted performance 
as the number of screens increases to the highest levels. However, my results together with Lee et al. 
(2010) or Biehl and Hoepner (2011) show no statistical significance between screening intensity and 
financial performance. 
Table 7 
The relationship between SRI strategies and financial performance 
This table summarises empirical studies on the relationship between social responsibility and financial 
performance. I consider the following hypotheses: H1. The relationship between the screening intensity 
and financial performance of SRI mutual funds is U-shaped. H2. The relationship between ESG rating and 
financial performance is positive. H3. SRI funds that use active engagement and voting have better financial 
performance than those that do not. “Yes” means that the hypothesis is accepted, and “No” means the 
hypothesis is not accepted. I use the following abbreviation to represent the studies: Barnett and Salomon 
(2006) for B&S, Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) for CBM, Renneboog et al. (2008) for RTZ, Lee et al. 
(2010) for LHBA, Biehl, and Hoepner (2011) for B&H. Sippola (19) refers to my paper. 
    B&S (06) CBM (14) RTZ (08) LHBA (10) B&H (11) Sippola (19) 
Country  US France 17 countries US UK Europe 
Period  1972-2002 2004-2007 1991-2003 1989-2006 1998-2010 2007-2019 
No. of obs. 61 116 440 61 50 127 
H1: U-shaped Yes Yes  No No No 
H2: ESG rating  No    No 
H3: Activism  No No   No 
 
 
3.3. Robustness tests 
 
To test the validity of the regression results for Jensen’s alpha, I repeat my main tests twice using both the 
Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966) and the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). The results in Table 8 show 
parallelism to Jensen’s alpha. First, screening intensity and the square of screening intensity both stay 
insignificant at 5 % level. Second, shareholder activism or fund age does not show a significant relationship 
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against financial performance. Third, the relationship between ESG ratings and financial performance is 
negative in all the different methods. However, it is good to notice that Carhart four-factor model loses the 
significance for the four different dummies representing ESG ratings, whereas Sharpe oppositely highlights 
the negative correlation effect for all ratings except ESG high at a 1 % significance level.  
Last, alpha in both Sharpe and Carhart stay significant at least at a 10 % level, both being negative as with 
Jensen’s alpha. All in all, given the results from the robustness tests, Jensen’s alpha can be considered as a 
reliable enough measure for risk-adjusted performance in this paper. 
 
Table 8 
The impact of robustness tests on financial performance 
This table presents regression results from robustness tests regarding risk-adjusted performance on SRI 
strategies. The dependent variables are the Sharpe ratio and the Carhart 4-factor model. The independent 
variables are screening intensity (SI), the square of screening intensity (SI^2), active ownership (activism), 
and different ESG ratings (excluding average ESG rating). The sample includes 127 SRI mutual funds. (D) 
indicates a dummy variable. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
        Jensen's alpha Sharpe ratio Carhart 4 factor 
          
SI    -0.013  -0.003  -0.031*  
    (0.020)  (0.004)  (0.018)  
SI^2    0.001  0.000  0.002*  
    (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Activism (D)   -0.049  -0.011*  -0.024  
    (0.036)  (0.007)  (0.032)  
ESG High (D)   -0.097**  -0.016*  -0.025  
    (0.045)  (0.008)  (0.041)  
ESG Above average (D)  -0.087**  -0.023***  -0.063*  
    (0.041)  (0.007)  (0.037)  
ESG Belov average (D)  0.152***  0.030***  0.028  
    (0.043)  (0.008)  (0.039)  
ESG Low (D)   0.291***  0.057***  0.116  
    (0.100)  (0.018)  (0.090)  
Size    0.043**  0.008*  0.053***  
    (0.021)  (0.004)  (0.019)  
MF    0.074***  0.012**  0.060**  
    (0.026)  (0.005)  (0.023)  
Age    0.002  0.001  -0.001  
    (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Constant    -0.402**  -0.200***  -0.316*  
    (0.199)  (0.036)  (0.179)  
R^2    0.371  0.421  0.200  
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have analysed the financial performance of European SRI funds compared to the financial 
markets during the period of 2007-2019. My analysis bases on OLS regression, applying Jensen’s alpha to 
estimate the main factors for over- or underperformance of 127 SRI funds compared to the market index 
(MSCI Europe Total Net Return). Besides, I have examined how the performance of the studied funds have 
evolved over economic cycles by studying two sub-periods of 2007-2013 and 2014-2019. The main fund-
specific variables in the paper are screening intensity, the square of screening intensity, shareholder 
activism and Morningstar’s ESG rating. 
The findings of my study suggest that there is not a significant relationship between screening intensity and 
financial performance for SRI funds, neither a significant curvilinear relationship. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that shareholder activism in ESG matters would positively relate to financial performance. 
However, I find evidence that funds with below-average or low ESG ratings outperform funds with above-
average or high ESG ratings. This result suggests that, on average, investors pursuing to invest in highly 
rated ESG funds must compromise financial returns on their investment strategy. Also, all the 127 SRI funds 
together lost a monthly alpha of -0.402 % at a 5 % significance level, meaning that SRI funds have generally 
underperformed the European equity markets.  
My results are partly contradicting to earlier research on the SRI universe. Friede et al. (2015) show in their 
meta-analysis of more than 2000 empirical studies that, since the mid-1990s, the positive correlation 
patterns in studies regarding ESG and Corporate Financial Performance have seemed stable over time. 
However, their findings hold for North America, Emerging Markets, and nonequity asset classes, leaving 
room for debate regarding studies focusing on European equity markets. Regarding the curvilinear (U-
shaped) relationship between screening intensity and SRI mutual fund financial performance, my results 
are in line with Lee et al. (2010) as well as Biehl and Hoepner (2011), not finding a significant curvilinear 
relationship either. The results of a non-significant relationship between shareholder activism towards ESG 
issues and financial performance are in line with Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) and Renneboog et al. 
(2008). Furthermore, in support of my findings regarding a negative relationship between fund ESG ratings 
and financial performance, e.g. Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) find similar significant results with 
their French SRI fund sample. 
Besides, opposite to earlier research findings on SRI mutual fund outperformance during periods of market 
crisis (Nofsinger et al., 2014), I find evidence that SRI mutual funds have underperformed the markets in 
Europe during 2007-2013 by -0.944 % on a monthly average. My results are significant at a 1 % level. On 
the other hand, SRI funds have outperformed markets during the recent economic upswing between 2014 
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and 2019 by a monthly average of 0.189 %. However, the results for 2014-2019 lose significance. The 
apparent improvement in the performance during the latter period suggests carefully that the recent boom 
in SRI investing has positively affected the returns of the socially responsible mutual funds. 
Overall, it is good to acknowledge that there are certain limitations to the results (see page 10). Moreover, 
it could be interesting to rerun the test for different markets with a wider sample of SRI funds, to see 
whether the main findings hold. Furthermore, examining the effects for different types of screens (e.g. 
environmental, social, positive, negative) would be an interesting addition to the variables. In addition to 
quantitative research, the results shown in this paper would provide interesting angles for qualitative 
research on the attitudes and choices made by SRI fund managers. As the SRI funds seem to have 
underperformed the markets over a longer-term, it would be interesting to examine to what extent and 
how the investors are willing to pay for their values. 
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